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RIEGEL V. MEDTRONIC IN LIGHT OF THE RECENT TREND IN
PREEMPTION CASES: A CASE FOR AMENDING THE MEDICAL
DEVICE ACT
Julie C. Soims'
The Medical Device Act of 1976 governs the Food and Drug
Administration's premarket approval process for medical devices.
In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., the United States Supreme Court held
that the Act preempts state tort claims against medical device
manufacturers. This Recent Development contends that the Court
appropriately decided Riegel in light of its recent trend towards a
more textual approach to statutory interpretation in federalism
cases in the administrative context. Post-Riegel decisions,
however, are improper in view of legislative intent and
unfavorably deprive plaintiffs of state tort remedies. Congress
should now amend the Medical Device Act in order to clariy its
purpose and to produce the effect originally intended
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 4, 2007, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.2 presented the
United States Supreme Court with the issue of whether premarket
approval ("PMA") by the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
preempts state claims against the manufacturer of a medical
device.3 Just over two months later, the Court determined, based
on the relevant language of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act,4 that PMA of a device does preempt a state claim,' a decision
which this Recent Development contends is contrary to
congressional intent.6 Although the modern trend of deciding
1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2010.
2 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008).
3 See id.
4 Medical Device Amendments of 1976. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2006).
See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. 999.
6 See discussion infra Part IV.
27
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federalism cases according to the theory of textualism7 properly led
to the Riegel decision, the legislative intent behind the Medical
Device Act ("MDA") makes it clear that legislation should be
passed to invalidate the Riegel decision to preserve the originally
envisioned protections.
Part II of this Recent Development outlines the FDA's PMA
process and discusses the Riegel decision. Part III describes the
Supreme Court's trend towards textualism' and how this trend
helps to explain the Riegel decision. Part IV discusses how the
legislative history of the MDA' would support the passage of
legislation invalidating Riegel. Part V describes the post-Riegel
world and explores some of the decisions' unfavorable
consequences. Part VI introduces the proposed Medical Device
Amendments of 200910 and argues that these Amendments should
be passed.
II. THE FDA's PREMARKET APPROVAL PROCESS AND RIEGEL V.
MEDTRONIC, INC.
A. The FDA's Premarket Approval Process
Until the MDA" was passed, the regulation of medical devices
was largely left to the discretion of each state.12 The Dalkon Shield
intrauterine device was introduced in 1970, and its association with
many deaths, serious infections, and pregnancies led to the filing of
See Karen A. Jordan, The Shifting Preemption Paradigm: Conceptual and
Interpretive Issues, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1149, 1210-11 (1998). While the term
"textualism" is often used to describe a method of constitutional interpretation,
Jordan uses the term to describe the plain meaning of statutory language. The
author of this Recent Development will use the term in this same way
throughout this Recent Development.
8See id.
921 U.S.C. § 360k (2006).
10 Medical Device Amendments of 2009. S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009);
Medical Device Amendments of 2009. H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009).
" 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-95 (2006).
12 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1002 (2008); Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1996).
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thousands of claims against the manufacturer.13 Through this
disaster, many saw the failure of the common law tort system to
handle the risks associated with medical devices appropriately 4.
Several states, including California, passed legislation requiring
medical devices to be approved prior to their introduction into the
market." In 1976, Congress passed the MDA which included an
express preemption provision in § 360,16 stating that no state shall
enforce any regulation "which is different from, or in addition to,
any requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and
... which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to
any other matter included in a requirement applicable to the device
under this chapter." 7
" See Riegel, 128 S.Ct at 1003 (citing RONALD J. BACIGAL, THE LIMITS OF
LITIGATION: THE DALKON SHIELD CONTROVERSY 3 (1990)); id. at 1014-15
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the litigation related to the
Dalkon Shield controversy, see Anna Birenbaum, Shielding the Masses: How
Litigation Changed the Face of Birth Control, 10 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 411 (2001).
14 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003 (citing SUSAN FOOTE, MANAGING THE MEDICAL
ARMS RACE: INNOVATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE MEDICAL DEVICE
INDUSTRY, 151-52 (1992)).
15 See id. (citing 1970 Cal. Stats. ch. 1573, §§ 26670-26693; see also Robert
B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of
Products Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L.REV. 691, 703, n.66
(1997) (identifying 13 state statutes governing medical devices as of 1976);
Brief for Petitioners at 6, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No.
06-179) ("When drafting the MDA, Congress was informed of state regulatory
programs that had stepped into the federal regulatory vacuum. Most notably, a
California statute required that medical devices undergo premarket approval
before commercial distribution in the state and that they comply with state good
manufacturing practices regulations." (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45
(1976))).
16 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2006); see also Alexandra B. Krass, Tort Experiments
in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501, 1548 (2009)
(discussing the Supremacy Clause in the U.S. Constitution and explaining
federal preemption).
" 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
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The MDA created three classes of medical devices based on
the risks of injury or illness associated with their use." Class III
devices, such as the Evergreen Balloon Catheter in Riegel,
discussed infra at Part II.B, require PMA by the FDA due to the
serious risks they present." Manufacturers of new Class III
devices must submit to the FDA a lengthy application, each of
which requires approximately 1,200 hours of FDA review.20 After
balancing the possible benefits with the potential risks of utilizing
the device, the FDA may grant PMA only if it finds "reasonable
assurance of [the device's] safety and effectiveness."2 1
Not all Class III medical devices, however, are required to
undergo this lengthy review process.22 Many devices that were on
the market prior to the passage of the MDA were authorized to
remain on the market without premarket approval until the FDA
passed a regulation requiring PMA.2 3 Other new devices "need not
undergo premarket approval if the FDA finds it is 'substantially
equivalent' to another device exempt from premarket approval."24
The FDA reviews such devices for substantial equivalence under a
process described by § 510(k) of the MDA and aptly called the
"section 5 10(k) process. "25
1 See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1003 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2006)) ("The new
regulatory regime established various levels of oversight for medical devices,
depending on the risks they present. Class I, which includes such devices as
elastic bandages and examination gloves, is subject to the lowest level of
oversight: 'general controls,' such as labeling requirements. Class II, which
includes such devices as powered wheelchairs and surgical drapes, is subject in
addition to 'special controls' such as performance standards and postmarket
surveillance measures.") (internal citations omitted).
1 21 U.S.C. § 360c.
20 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477 (1996).
21 21 U.S.C. § 360d(a)(1) (2006).
22 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1004.
23 Id (citing 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(f)(1), 360e(b)(1) (2006)).
24 Id (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360c(t)(1)(A) (2006)).
25 Id ("Most new Class III devices enter the market through § 510(k). In
2005, for example, the FDA authorized the marketing of 3,148 devices under
§ 5 10(k) and granted premarket approval to just 32 devices." (citing 21 U.S.C.
§ 5 10(k) (2006); PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL, & LEWIS A.
GROSSMAN, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 992 (3d ed. 2007))).
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B. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.
The FDA's PMA process under § 360, specifically the express
preemption provision in § 360(k), was at issue in Riegel. In 1996,
Charles Riegel ("Riegel") suffered a myocardial infarction 26 and
underwent coronary angioplasty2 7 surgery.28 His surgeon used an
Evergreen Balloon Catheter2 9 in an attempt to unblock a calcified
artery.30 In doing so, the surgeon overinflated the balloon, and the
catheter burst.31  Riegel then underwent emergency coronary
bypass surgery after developing heart block3 2 and being placed on
life support.3 3
26 A myocardial infarction is commonly known as a heart attack. U.S. Nat'l
Library of Med., U.S. Nat'l Inst. of Health, Heart Attack: MedlinePlus Medical
Encyclopedia. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000 195.htm
(last visited Aug. 6, 2009) ("A heart attack is when blood vessels that supply
blood to the heart are blocked, preventing enough oxygen from getting to the
heart. The heart muscle dies or becomes permanently damaged.") (on file with
the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
27 "Angioplasty is a procedure to open narrowed or blocked blood vessels that
supply blood to the heart." U.S. Nat'l Library of Med., U.S. Nat'l Inst. of
Health, Angioplasty and Stent Placement-Heart: MedlinePlus Medical
Encyclopedia. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002953.htm
(last visited August 6, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Journal of Law &
Technology).
28 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1005 (2008).
29 A balloon catheter is a flexible tube used in a coronary angioplasty. When
inserted into a blocked blood vessel and inflated, the balloon "opens the blocked
vessel and restores proper blood flow to the heart." U.S. Nat'1 Library of Med.,
U.S. Nat'l Institute of Health, Angioplasty and Stent Placement-Heart:
MedlinePlus Medical Encyclopedia. http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/article/002953.htm (last visited Aug. 6, 2009) (on file with the North
Carolina Journal of Law & Technology).
30 See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
' See id
3 2 Heart block is the "incoordination of the heartbeat in which the atria and
ventricles beat independently due to defective transmission through the
[atrioventricular bundle] and which is marked by decreased cardiac output often
with [deficient supply of blood to the brain]." Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
http://www2.merriam-webster.com/cgi-bin/mwmednlm?book=Medical&va=
heart%20block (last visited Sept. 8, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
3 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1005.
11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 27,32
Riegel v. Medtronic: Case for Amending MDA
Riegel and his wife brought suit against Medtronic in April
1999,34 alleging that Medtronic had violated New York common
law by negligently designing, manufacturing, and labeling the
catheter." Through this negligence, the Riegels claimed,
Medtronic had caused Riegel to suffer serious and permanent
injuries." The District Court held that the FDA approval of the
Evergreen Balloon Catheter preempted the Riegels' claims of strict
liability, breach of implied warranty, and "negligence in the
design, testing, inspection, distribution, labeling, marketing, and
sale of the catheter."3 7  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court's decision because the Riegels' claims,
"if successful[,] would impose state requirements 'different from,
or in addition to' those imposed via PMA process."
Mrs. Riegel then appealed the case to the United States
Supreme Court, which focused its decision on § 360k(a), the
MDA's express preemption clause. The clause reads as follows:
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue
in effect with respect to a device intended for human use any
requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any






' Id. at 1006 (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a; Complaint 3-4). Additionally,
the District Court held that the MDA preempted the negligent manufacturing
claim because this claim was not based on an alleged violation of federal law.
Id The MDA also preempted Mrs. Riegel's loss of consortium claim due to the
fact that this claim was based on the other preempted claims. Id. The District
Court also granted summary judgment to Medtronic on claims of breach of
express warranty, negligent manufacturing based on a lack of compliance with
federal standards, and Donna Riegel's claim of derivative consortium. Id. n.2.
These claims did not come before the United States Supreme Court, and they
will not be discussed further in this Recent Development.
' Id. at 1003 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 360k(a), 52 1(a) (2006)).
' 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, divided the issue into two
parts: 1) whether the FDA regulations applied to the Medtronic
catheter, and if so, 2) whether the Riegels' claims are based on
New York regulations that are "different from, or in addition to"
the FDA requirements, and whether the New York regulations
"relate to safety and effectiveness."40 The Court addressed the first
issue by following the precedent established by Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr,4 1 determining that the PMA process established by
§ 360k(a)(1) focuses on the safety of a particular device, thus
imposing "requirements."4 2 The Evergreen Balloon Catheter was
approved via the PMA process, and therefore the safety of the
Catheter had presumably been closely inspected. As such, Justice
Scalia determined that the Riegels' claims were preempted by the
MDA. Justice Scalia also adhered to the precedent set by Lohr
when he discussed the second issue, stating that "common-law
causes of action for negligence and strict liability do impose
'requirement[s]' and would be pre-empted by federal requirements
specific to a medical device."43
40 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008) (citing § 360k(a)).
41 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996). In Lohr, the Class III device
was a pacemaker that was approved by the FDA via the § 510(k) process
because it was substantially similar to one that had already been approved. Id.
21 U.S.C. § 510 does not have an express preemption provision, and thus, FDA
approval under § 510 does not preempt state tort claims of negligent
manufacture. Id.
42 See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1006-07 (describing what is meant by
"requirements," since 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) only preempts state requirements
"different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable ... to the device"
under federal law). Justice Scalia also noted that the MDA does not preempt
state tort claims concerning devices approved by the FDA under 5 10(k) because
those devices are not individually tested for safety by the FDA. Id.
43 Id. at 1007 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 512 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Thomas, J.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part)); Lohr, 518 U.S. at 503-05 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also Bates v. Dow Agrisciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 443
(2005) (finding that a provision of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act stated that certain States "shall not impose or continue in effect
any requirements ... in addition to or different from those required under this
subchapter," preempts common-law claims. (citing 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000))).
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Justice Ginsburg dissented, focusing on the legislative intent of
the MDA, and stating that "Congress, in [her] view, did not intend
§ 360k(a) to effect a radical curtailment of state common-law suits
seeking compensation for injuries caused by defectively designed
or labeled medical devices."44 She also focused on policy, stating
that "[p]reemption analysis starts with the assumption that 'the
historic police powers of the States [a]re not to be superseded ...
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "4
The goal of this assumption was to ensure that neither the courts
nor Congress would inadvertently disturb the balance between
federal and state laws.46 The health and safety of citizens has
generally been the concern of state governments,4 7 and the federal
government has traditionally deferred to state police powers "to
legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort,
and quiet of all persons."48
Justice Stevens concurred in part and concurred in the
judgment based on a reconciliation of the majority opinion and the
dissent.49 While he agreed that Justice Ginsburg accurately laid out
the historical foundation for and the congressional intent behind
the MDA, Justice Stevens believed that "it is ultimately the
provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our
legislators by which we are governed.""o He therefore concurred
44 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45 Id. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
46 Id. (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (internal
citation omitted)).
47 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996); see also
Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)
("The regulation of health and safety matters is primarily and historically a
matter of local concern.").
48 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985)
(quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873)).
49 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1011-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment).
50 Id. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80
(1998)).
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with the majority in the judgment, believing that the text of the
federal statute preempts the state claims.'
III. MODERN TREND IN FEDERALISM CASES: THE REASONING
BEHIND RIEGEL
Although Part VI argues that the MDA should be amended in
order to avoid the preemption of legitimate state claims against
medical device manufacturers in the future,52 this Recent
Development does not contend that the Supreme Court was out of
line in deciding Riegel as it did. While the Riegel decision does
not fall in line with a legislative intent approach to statutory
interpretation, the Supreme Court appropriately decided the case
in light of its recent trend of taking a textualist approach to
statutory interpretation in federalism cases. The issue of
federalism in the administrative context has recently drawn more
notice than usual due to the Supreme Court's decision of several
such cases since 2000, most recently in the 2009 term.54 In the
context of state tort law, the Court has been increasingly willing to
allow federal regulations to override state claims by utilizing a
more textual approach to statutory interpretation since the late
1980's." This is in contrast to the Court's approach between the
1930's and the early 1980's during which it broadly accepted the
"i Id at 1011- 13 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
52 See infra Part VI.
53 See infra Part V.
54 See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Tennis with the Net Down: Administrative
Federalism Without Congress, 57 DUKE L.J. 2111, 2133 n.83 (2008). Note that
the "two new cases" discussed in this footnote have been decided since the
article was published in May 2008: Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538
(2008) (decided December 15, 2008) and Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187
(2009) (decided March 4, 2009) (See infra note 121).
See Jordan, supra note 7, at 1211 n.287. It is no coincidence that this trend
began just after Justice Scalia joined the Court in 1986, as Scalia "urged the
Court to adopt textualism as its interpretive regimen." Thomas A. Bishop, The
Death and Reincarnation of Plain Meaning in Connecticut: A Case Study, 41
CoNN. L. REV. 825, 841 (2009).
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originalist approach.56 For a century before the late 1980's, the
court participated only minimally in the review of state tort
claims. The FDA in particular has long enjoyed a successful
record in the Supreme Court due to the justices' remarkable
deference to the agency's expertise in promoting public health."
Riegel appears to fit the Supreme Court's trend of deciding modem
preemption cases on the basis of textualism. 9
In Riegel, Justice Scalia lays out a careful path, interpreting the
preemption provision of the MDA strictly from the language of the
statute, without much consideration of the legislative intent behind
the provision. As noted supra Part II(B), the Riegel Court found
that common law causes of action imposed "requirements" that
were preempted by the FDA requirements of § 360k.60 The Court
then placed emphasis on the definition of the term "requirement"
so as to give Congress notice of how the Court will interpret that
term under similar circumstances in the future.61 Justice Scalia
clearly asserted that "[a]bsent other indication, reference to a
State's 'requirements' includes its common-law duties."62
The Riegel approach sharply contrasts with the Court's
approach to similar issues in the past, as it has formerly said that
though the "starting point is the language of the statute, "63 "in
expounding a statute, we [are] not .. . guided by a single sentence
or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole
56 See Jordan, supra note 7, at 1202 (describing originalism as "the tradition of
striving to discover original legislative intent or purpose.").
5 See Krass, supra note 16, at 1543 ("Notably, after more than one hundred
years of minimal involvement in reviewing state tort law the Court has in the
past two decades been increasingly willing to allow Congress and federal
agencies to override state tort law as a matter of constitutional law, statutory
interpretation, and agency deference.").
58 See Lars Noah, The Little Agency that Could (Act with Indifference to
Constitutional and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REv. 901 (2008).
See Jordan, supra note 7.
60 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007 (2008).
61 See id at 1008.62 id
63 Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 5 (1985).
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law, and to its object and policy."64 The Court would have come to
a very different conclusion had it given more weight to the
congressional intent of the MDA when it was originally passed in
1976.65
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE MDA
Justice Ginsburg stated in her dissent that the "purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-emption analysis," 66 and
provided enough evidence to convince Justice Stevens that "the
overriding purpose of the legislation was to provide additional
protection to consumers, not to withdraw existing protections.
As briefly discussed in Part II(A),6 Congress adopted the MDA in
response to the numerous injuries and deaths caused by a series of
defective medical devices, including the Dalkon Shield intrauterine
device. 69  "Given the publicity attending the Dalkon Shield
litigation and Congress' awareness of the suits at the time the MDA
was under consideration, [Justice Ginsburg found] informative the
absence of any sign of a legislative design to preempt state
common-law tort actions. Put simply, Justice Ginsburg believed
that, had legislators intended the MDA to have a preemptive effect
64 Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (quoting Pilot Life Ins.
Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 51 (1987) (alteration in original)).
65 See infra Part IV.
66 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992)).
67 Id. at 1012 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citing Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
See supra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
69 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1014-15 & nn.5-6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
70 Id. at 1015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Meditronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 491 (1996)); S.Rep. No. 94-33, at 6 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1076 ("Some 10,000 injuries were recorded, of which 731
resulted in death. For example, 512 deaths and 300 injuries were attributed to
heart valves; 89 deaths and 186 injuries to heart pacemakers; 10 deaths and
8,000 injuries to intrauterine devices."); 122 CoNG. REC. 5859 (1976) (remarks
of Rep. Waxman) ("A 10-year FDA death-certificate search found over 850
deaths tied directly to medical devices."); 121 CoNG. REC. at 10689-90 (1975)
(remarks of Sen. Nelson); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 476 (1996)).
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in the context of state tort claims, they could have made that
intention clear in the text of the statute.'
The stated purpose of the MDA, noted in the Act's preamble is
"to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices
intended for human use."72 During the debate of S. 510,73 the bill
that later became the MDA, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, as a
sponsor of the bill, stated that "[lt]he legislation is written so that
the benefit of the doubt is always given to the consumer. After all,
it is the consumer who pays with his health and his life for medical
device malfunctions."74 In an effort to describe the intent of
Congress in passing the MDA, Sen. Kennedy and Representative
Henry A. Waxman submitted an amici curiae brief in support of
the petitioner in Riegel. Sen. Kennedy indicated in his brief that in
§ 360k(b), Congress allowed for exemptions from preemption
when the state or local requirement is more strict than the federal
regulation.75 Sen. Kennedy continued, indicating that Congress
specifically pointed out California's stringent requirements and
noted that those requirements should still be observed following
the passage of federal legislation. Sen. Kennedy then spoke
directly to the congressional intent behind § 360k(b), stating that
"consistent with the focus on public safety in the MDA, Congress
favored patient protection over nationwide uniformity."76
Justice Ginsburg noted Sen. Kennedy's views during the Riegel
oral arguments, explaining:
[T]here's an argument that what [the preemption provision] was
intended to do was to cut out State pre-market approval, where States
like California77 came in when there was a Federal void and said we
See Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1015 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
72 Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539
(preamble) (1976).
73 S. 510, 94th Cong. (1975) (enacted).
74 Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1014 n.4 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting 121 CONG.
REC. 10688 (Apr. 17, 1975) (Statement of Sen. Kennedy).
See Brief for Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc. 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) (No. 06-179) (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 94-85 at 4) (1976)).
76 Id. at 6.
See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 15, at 2.
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shouldn't let the manufacturers put out whatever they'd like. Let's have
a pre-market approval. And the argument . . . which was presented in
Senator Kennedy's brief, [is that] that's what [Congress] meant to do
with the preemption provision. Nothing more.
Justice Ginsburg supports this argument in her dissent, opining that
the legislature's intention in § 360k(a) was not to "effect a radical
curtailment" of state tort claims. '
Upon hearing of the Riegel decision, Sen. Kennedy stated that
"Congress never intended that F.D.A. approval would give blanket
immunity to manufacturers from liability for injuries caused by
faulty devices."" Rep. Waxman responded similarly, saying "[lt]he
Supreme Court's decision strips consumers of the rights they've
had for decades. This isn't what Congress intended, and we'll pass
legislation as quickly as possible to fix this nonsensical
situation."" While these statements alone do not give irrefutable
evidence of the legislative intent of the MDA, "surely Kennedy
and Waxman, leaders in the enactment of the [MDA], are more
privy to congressional deliberations on congressional aims than
Justice Scalia[.]"82
78 Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-26, Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct.
999 (2007) (No. 06-179) (internal footnote added).
79Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1013 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see Ashley W.
Warren, Preemption of Claims Related to Class III Medical Devices: Are the
Federal Objectives of Public Health and Safety Furthered or Hindered?, 49
SMU L. REV. 619, 633 (1996) (citing Lars Noah, Amplification of Federal
Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 185 (1994)
("Congress left no question that its intent was for the MDA to have a broad
preemptive effect.")).
0 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Shield Medical Devices from Lawsuits, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2008, at Al (internal quotation marks omitted), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/washington/21device.html.
81 Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
82 Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm:
Conflicting Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 987, 997 n.56
(2009) (describing the following as Justice Scalia's "armchair commentary": "it
is implausible that the MDA was meant to 'grant greater power (to set state
standards 'different from, or in addition to' federal standards) to a single state
jury than to state officials acting through state administrative or legislative
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For those who are not persuaded that the legislative intent of
the MDA evidences intent to preempt state tort claims, consider
the modern view of preemption that evolved in response to the
post-1930 reformation of American federalism in light of changing
interpretations of the Commerce Clause.83 According to this view,
there is a "presumption that state laws would survive unless
Congress clearly manifested its intent that a federal statute would
preempt state law."84 Two notable cases exemplify this view of
preemption-Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp." and Mintz v.
Baldwin." Rice reiterated the presumption against preemption in
traditional areas of state control when clear congressional intent is
absent." In Mintz, the legislative intent of the federal Cattle
Contagious Diseases Acts was held to be not clear enough to
preempt a state law designed to prevent contagious cattle
diseases." Thus, according to the modern view of preemption,
state law should not be preempted in traditional areas of state
control absent clear congressional intent.
V. THE POST-RIEGEL WORLD
Post-Riegel customer claims against medical device
manufacturers have not produced desirable results.8 9 Consideration
of the consequences of Riegel strengthens the argument that
Congress should implement the amendments introduced by H.R.
1346 and S. 540, as the Court's interpretation of the MDA "cut[s]
lawmaking processes.' That perverse distinction is not required or even
suggested by the broad language Congress chose in the MDA, and we will not
turn somersaults to create it." (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999,
1008 (2008) (citation omitted)).
8 See Jordan, supra note 7, at 1156 (citing Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 510-15 (1989)).
84 See id.
1 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
86 289 U.S. 346 (1933).
87 Rice, 331 U.S. at 237.
88 Mintz, 289 U.S. at 352.
89 See infra notes 94-104 and accompanying text.
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deeply into a domain historically occupied by state law.""o In the
post-Riegel world, state claims against manufacturers of premarket
approved medical devices will be preempted by the FDA's PMA
of those devices unless Congress amends the MDA.9 1
In deciding Riegel, the Court approved a system in which some
consumers harmed by medical devices will not be compensated.92
Courts across the country have already been faced with Riegel-like
issues, and they have largely followed the Supreme Court's lead.93
As long as the manufacturers in these cases have obtained PMA
prior to marketing their device and have not made any changes to
their device after acquiring PMA, the state claims have regularly
been preempted. Courts now apply the Riegel reasoning set out by
Justice Scalia94 in deciding whether a particular claim is preempted
90 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
91 Tort claims will continue, however, to provide relief in cases of
manufacturer noncompliance, even when those devices have PMA. See Harvard
Law Review Association, Preemption ofState Common Law Claims, 122 HARV.
L. REv. 405, 412 (2008). Manufacturers must submit a supplemental
application to the FDA and wait for FDA approval prior to changing anything
that "affects safety and effectiveness." 21 U.S.C. § 360e(d)(6)(A)(i) (2006).
Should a manufacturer make a change in the design or labeling of a device after
receiving PMA without disclosing that change to the FDA, that manufacturer
violates FDA regulations, and thus will not be protected by preemption. A
successful claim, however, would be based on federal rather than state law. See
Harvard Law Review Association, Preemption of State Common Law Claims,
122 HARV. L. REV. 405, 412 (2008)). In Gomez v. St. Jude Med. Daig Div. Inc.,
442 F.3d 919 (5th Cir. 2006), for example, the Fifth Circuit reversed in part the
judgment of the district court due to the fact that the plaintiffs claims of
defective manufacturing were not preempted by the MDA to the extent that the
defendant manufacturer did not comply with FDA-approved specifications.
However, the Fifth Circuit correctly affirmed in part the district court's holding
that the state defective design claims were preempted by the MDA.
92 See Harvard Law Review Association, supra note 91, at 412.
93 For a fuller discussion of post-Riegel medical device case law, see Gregory
J. Wartman, Life After Riegel: A Fresh Look at Medical Device Preemption
One Year After Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 291 (2009).
94 See supra note 60-62 and accompanying text.
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by the MDA.95 Two questions must be answered according to
Riegel: 1) whether the device is subject to federal government
requirements, and 2) whether the plaintiffs claims are based on
state regulations that qualify as regulations that are "different from,
or in addition to" such federal requirements and that "relate[] to
... safety and effectiveness."9
The Supreme Court of New York in Madison County, for
example, granted summary judgment to a medical device
manufacturer in Lake v. Kardjian9 7 on December 17, 2008. The
medical device involved was the Targis transurethral microwave
therapy system, used to treat an enlarged prostate.98 The plaintiff,
William Lake, alleged that the device damaged both his urethra
and his urinary sphincter, and caused him to undergo numerous
surgeries.99 The Madison County court found that Lake's
negligence claim, breach of implied warranty claim, and strict
liability claim were preempted by the MDA.oo The court found
that the MDA also preempted a claim that the defendant
manufacturer was required by state common law to provide
warnings in addition to those approved by the FDA.' Thus,
although Lake has suffered myriad injuries allegedly caused by the
Targis system, the fact that the FDA approved the Targis system as
safe and effective within the meaning of § 360e denies Lake any
compensation that might otherwise be due.'02 Several other post-
95 See, e.g., Bausch v. Stryker Corp., 2008 WL 5157940 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9,
2008).
96 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1006 (2008) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a) (2006)).
97 874 N.Y.S.2d 751 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008).
98 Id
99 See id. at 753.
100 See id. at 754.
ioi See id.
102 Other avenues may be found through which plaintiffs like the one in Lake
will find relief, but they will not get compensation through a state tort claim.
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Riegel state claims against medical device manufacturers have had
similar results.103
Even manufacturers of medical devices that are recalled after
PMA are immune from state tort claims.104 In Bausch v. Stryker
Corp., the Northern District of Illinois decided that a total hip
replacement prosthesis produced by the defendant corporation,
though recalled "due to dimensional anomalies,""' had still
acquired PMA from the FDA, and was thus not subject to liability
on the basis of a state tort claim. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out
in Riegel, "[t]he Court's holding does not reach an important issue
outside the bounds of this case: the preemptive effect of § 360k(a)
where evidence of a medical device's defect comes to light only
after the device receives premarket approval."'i6
Physicians also fear the repercussions of Riegel, having
expressed concerns that this decision will negatively impact
consumer health and safety. The necessity of amending the MDA
has also been expressed by physicians."' A recently published
article in the New England Journal of Medicine discusses the
injustice of preemption and declares that it "will . . . result in the
reduced safety of drugs and medical devices for the American
people."os As the authors of the article explain, tort litigation
provides information to the FDA about the safety of drugs and
103 See, e.g., Despain v. Bradburn, 282 S.W.3d 814 (Ark. 2008); Mullin v.
Guidant Corp., 970 A.2d 733 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009); Troutman v. Curtis, 185
P.3d 930 (Kan. 2008); Blunt v. Medtronic, Inc., 760 N.W.2d 396 (Wis. 2009).
104 But note that "parallel claims" may escape preemption. See Beck
Herrmann, (New) Medical Device Preemption Scorecard. http://
druganddevicelaw.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-medical-device-preemption-
scorecard.html (last visited August 7, 2009) (on file with the North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology).
i05 Trial Pleading, Complaint, Bausch v. Stryker Corp. et al., No. 108-CV-
04248, 2008 WL 4227478 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
106 Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1013 n.1 (2008) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original).
10 See House Bill Would Declare Medical Device Claims Not Preempted, 44-
SEP JTLATRIAL 10 (2008).
i08 Gregory D. Curfman et al., Why Doctors Should Worry about Preemption,
359 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1, 2 (2008), available at http://content.nejm.
org/cgi/content/full/359/1/1.
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medical devices, and it acts in conjunction with FDA regulations to
encourage safer practices by manufacturers.'0 9 Preemption would
do away with this source of information, ultimately resulting in a
decrease in device safety."o
VI. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MDA
The disconnect between the Riegel holding, the legislative
intent of the MDA, and public policy, presents a significant
problem."' Looking at Riegel as part of the modern trend of
determining federalism issues on basic statutory interpretation, it
seems that the majority appropriately decided the case based on the
text of the MDA. Despite the frustration of uncompensated
plaintiffs in trial level tort suits, it is not the place of the Court to
make the policy determinations112 that would be necessary to
prevent FDA approval of medical devices from preempting state
tort claims. It is now for Congress to determine whether policy
dictates that MDA amendments are necessary.
Following the Riegel decision, on June 26, 2008, Congressman
Frank Pallone, Jr. ("Rep. Pallone") of New Jersey, along with 71
co-sponsors, introduced H.R. 6381"' to the House. The bill
proposed amending the MDA to clarify that Congress did not
109 See id.; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of
Respondent in Wyeth v. Levine, Senator Arlen Specter, Senate Regulatory
Preemption Hearing at 133-34 (discussing the possible preemption of state tort
claims against drug manufacturers by FDA approval of drug labels). See
generally Matthew S. Reid, Vermont Supreme Court Rules that Food and Drug
Administration Regulations Do not Preempt State Failure-to-Warn Claims-
Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179 (VT. 2006), 4 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 413
(2008).
10 See Curfman et al., supra note 108.
See supra Part V.
12 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) ("The constitutional role of the
courts, however, is to decide concrete cases-not to serve as a convenient forum
for policy debates."). But see Dole v. United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26,
35 (1990) (stating that the Court is "not guided by a single sentence or member
of a sentence, but look[s] to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy.") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
"1 Medical Device Safety Act of 2008. HR. 6381, 110th Cong. (2008).
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intend for § 360k to be an express preemption provision.114 An
identical bill, S. 3398, was introduced in the Senate on July 31,
2008 by Sen. Kennedy,'15 together with fifteen co-sponsors. 116 If
passed, this legislation would have invalidated Riegel and allowed
state tort claims to escape preemption by the MDA. Neither bill
was passed during the 110th session of Congress, and Rep. Pallone
and Sen. Kennedy reintroduced identical bills, H.R. 1346117 and S.
540,"' respectively, on March 5, 2009,"9 the day after the Wyeth v.
Levinel20 decision. As of this writing, neither of these bills has
been passed into law.12'
114
u1 It is noteworthy that Senator Kennedy sponsored S. 3398, as he was
involved in the passage of the original MDA in 1976.
116 Medical Device Amendments of 2009. S. 3398, 110th Cong. (2009).
17 Medical Device Amendments of 2009. H.R. 1346, 111th Cong. (2009).
118 Medical Device Amendments of 2009. S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009).
119 As of July 7, 2009, H.R. 1346 has been referred to the Subcommittee on
Health within the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and a
subcommittee hearing has been held. http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query
/z?cI I 1:S.540:. As of the same date, S. 540 has been referred to the Senate
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. Id.
20 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (determining that premarket
approval by the FDA under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not
preempt a state failure-to-warn claim against a drug manufacturer). Note that 21
U.S.C. § 352 (2006) (the relevant statute in Wyeth), unlike the MDA, does not
contain an express preemption provision, making Wyeth a less complicated case.
Id. at 1196 ("And when Congress enacted an express pre-emption provision for
medical devices in 1976, see § 521, 90 Stat. 574 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k(a)), it declined to enact such a provision for prescription drugs."). The
Court notes that Congress could have enacted an express preemption provision
for prescription drugs had it so desired. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200.
121 Plaintiffs' attorneys have already attempted to use S. 3398 and H.R. 6381
to their advantage. See McCutcheon v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 586 F. Supp.2d
917, 923-24 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (stating in response to plaintiffs counsel's urging
that the District Court "act, not as taught by Riegel .. , but rather according to a
bill recently introduced in the House of Representatives that, if enacted, would
overturn Riegel" that it would be "irresponsible [for the District Court] to ignore
controlling Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent in favor of prospective
legislation"); Link v. Zimmer Holdings, Inc., 604 F. Supp.2d 1174, 1179-80
(N.D. Ill. 2008) (declining to decide the case "based upon alleged congressional
motivations in conflict with the Supreme Court's ruling or upon a potential law
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The bills would add clear language to § 360k, specifically
stating that § 360k should have "[n]o [e]ffect on [1]iability [u]nder
[s]tate [flaw," and that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed
to modify or otherwise affect any action for damages or the
liability of any person under the law of any State."122 This
legislation appears more closely aligned to Congress's intentions
for the MDA, and from a policy standpoint, would result in more
favorable outcomes in future state tort claims against medical
devices manufacturers. 12 3 Should the Supreme Court continue to
follow the modern trend of using basic statutory construction to
interpret statutes in federalism cases, Congress must replace the
current language of § 360k with an unambiguous statement in
order to avoid the MDA's preemption of future state tort claims.
VI. CONCLUSION
While the U.S. Supreme Court appropriately decided Riegel
based on a basic statutory construction approach to interpreting
§ 360k, the legislative intent of the statute is contrary to the
majority's decision, and the decision has produced unfavorable
outcomes in post-Riegel state tort suits against medical device
manufacturers. Congress now has the opportunity to look at the
disconnect between the intent of the statute and its interpretation
by the Court and to amend the preemption provision of the MDA
to reflect the policy by which it wants the judicial system to abide.
that may or may not be passed by Congress at an unknown point in the future").
Similarly, the Riegel Court noted, "it is not our job to speculate upon
congressional motives. If we were to do so, however, the only indication
available-the text of the statute-suggests that the solicitude for those injured
by FDA-approved devices, which the dissent finds controlling, was overcome in
Congress's estimation by solicitude for those who would suffer without new
medical devices if juries were allowed to apply the tort law of 50 states to all
innovations." Riegel, 128 S. Ct. at 1009.
122 Medical Device Amendments of 2009, S. 540, 111th Cong. (2009);
Medical Device Amendments of 2009, H.R. 1346, 11Ith Cong. (2009).
123 See discussion supra Part V (describing the lack of judicial recourse for
patients harmed by medical devices and the concerns of physicians that federal
preemption of state tort claims against medical device manufacturers will
ultimately result in reduced safety of these devices).
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By passing H.R. 1346 and S. 540, Congress can effectively
invalidate the Riegel decision and elucidate the legislative intent of
the MDA for the Court. In doing so, it will prevent FDA PMA
from preempting future state tort claims and provide much needed
relief to patients injured by medical devices.
